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EXPERT EVIDENCE IN BALLISTICS
WILLIAM MCGEE JAMES*

Inventions and inovations of late years have greatly
affected the home, the factory, and the store. Scientists
and inventors have devoted most of their efforts toward
improving living and working conditions and heretofore
have neglected the courts and the administration of justice. Through the efforts of the press and various individuals who have become interested in the administration
of justice, the attention of science has been recently directed to the detection and prosecution of criminals. As
a consequence, efforts have been made to use the phonograph, the moving picture machine, the lie-detector and
other inventions and sciences, not the least important of
which is the science of ballistics. This article is confined
to what is now commonly referred to as the science of
ballistics. It is not the author's intention to prove that
the testimony of a ballistic expert should or should not
be admitted in the trial of a criminal case, but rather to
discuss the more important legal questions resulting
from the use of this comparatively new science.
The evidence of ballistic experts in criminal cases is
now frequently applied to identifying a particular gun
from which a designated bullet has been fired, or in
which a designated shell has been exploded. In order
to understand the legal aspects of the question, it would
seem appropriate at this point to select the testimony of
a ballistic expert and abstract the same. While the testimony of the expert in any given case will depend largely
upon the individual facts in the case, -nevertheless the
testimony in the different cases must necessarily follow
somewhat the same lines. Let us assume a criminal case
involving the trial of several defendants on a charge of
murder, where it is sought to prove by a ballistic expert
that a bullet which has been introduced in evidence has
been fired from a revolver which has been introduced in
* Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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evidence, and that certain discharged shotgun shells
which have likewise been introduced in evidence, have
been fired from a shotgun which has also been admitted
in evidence. The testimony of the expert we will assume
is substantially as follows:
My name is X. I am a consultant on small arms and
projectiles in civil and criminal cases, and devote all of
my time to this sort of work. I have the following preliminary education to fit me for my present occupation:
An A.B. degree from John Hopkins University in Baltimore and an M.B. degree from the same University, and
I am a graduate of the Army Medical School in Washington. I am a Lieutenant Colonel in the Ordinance
Reserve in the United States Army at the present time.
At the age of fifteen I began visiting munition factories,
and, as the opportunity presented itself, I have studied
their methods of manufacturing small arms, and have
visited practically every manufacturer of fire arms in
this country. I have studied the methods of the various
factories, and as an Ordinance Officer, I have been on
duty at government arsenals and taken part in the manufacture of fire arms including revolvers, pistols, small
arms, munitions and ammunitions used in such arms, and
also the powders that are used therein. I have made a
study of the literature of all available languages on the
identification of fire arms, and for a period of years I
have collected the necessary data and specimens which
figure in my work. I have been consulted by experts associated with the governments of foreign nations relative to the manufacturing of fire arms. I have in my
possession thousands of specimens of unfired and fired
bullets and shells, some scores of specimens of different
types of powder used in small armsI ammunitions, many
hundreds of specimens of arms which I use for comparison and reference work, and numerous instruments of
precision in the form of microscopes, gauges, micrometers and phonographic apparatus, many of which have
been made for my work alone. It is possible to tell by
examining a fired bullet what company made the bullet.
By the use of a blackboard I will illustrate to the court
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and jury the method used by me in identifying the
source and manufacture of a bullet. Peoples Exhibit
No. A which has just been shown to me, is a
fired lead mushroom bullet, flattened out on the
nose, the nose containing dark material which was
Its caliber, alevidently picked up in its flight.
though it is very much distorted both at the nose and
base, is what is commonly known as a .38, and it shows
on its surface the imprint of five right wing grooves inclined to the right. From my experience I should say a
.38 caliber gun fired the bullet which has been shown to
me. Furthermore, from my experience and study and
experiments in connection with the evidence bullet, I can
tell what make of gun fired the bullet and I can say
whether or not I have seen the gun that fired the bullet.
Peoples Exhibit No. B is a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver known as the military and police type, or Model
No. 1905, handling .38 short and long colt and .38 Smith
& Wesson special, and .38 colt special ammunition. In
my opinion that is the gun that fired Peoples Exhibit No.
A, and I have made an experiment to determine whether
or not my opinion is true. The experiment I have made
is as follows: I have examined the interior of this arm
and cylinder. It was foul and the fouling was of a black
powder type. The bullet in evidence gave evidence of
having passed thru a barrel that was quite foul. It was
of a caliber and type compatible with having been fired
thru an arm such as this. I therefore secured ammunition as similar to the bullet in evidence as I was able to
secure of the same caliber and type, loaded with black
powder, and thereupon fired a specimen thru the barrel
of this weapon into a container full of cotton waste and
compared it with the bullet in evidence under a microscope. The markings on those two bullets were largely
identical, black powder leaving very large residue on
firing, causing a considerable variation in markings from
shot to shot by reason of the fact that some residue is
fired out on each shot and new residue is left. The
residue acts as a foreign substance which marks each
bullet and puts temporary markings on each bullet which

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

in some measure obscures the permanent markings of
the barrel. In spite of variations in temporary markings
there are present enough permanent markings to satisfy
me that the bulletin in evidence has been fired thru the
weapon in evidence. In the first place, the evidence
bullet bears five grooves inclined to the right. Of the
arms which have been shown to me, the only one which
bears five grooves inclined to the right is the Smith &
Wesson. This bullet weights 150 grains and was of a
type not compatible with its having been fired thru an
arim chambered for a .38 Smith & Wesson, but was of a
type compatible with having been fired thru an arm
chambered for the Smith & Wesson .38 special. The
arm in question is chambered for the .38 Smith & Wesson special cartridge but does not handle the .38 Smith
& Wesson bullet. I compared the test bullet to which I
have previously referred to, with the evidence bullet
under a microscope. The width of the grooves and the
angles of the grooves of the evidence bullet coincide with
the width and angle of the grooves present on the test
bullet which I fired. No two arms' makers, even though
they use the same number of grooves inclined in the
same direction, ever use grooves of the same width and
angle. A comparison miscroscope consists of two ordinary microscopes placed side by side and joined at their
tops by a cross arm which contains prisms. We will indicate (drawing on blackboard) a single miscroscope beneath which we have placed a bullet which we will call
the evidence bullet. Beneath another miscroscope placed
beside the first one, we locate the test bullet I fired
through the arm under study. I illustrate the single
groove on each of these bullets being a groove left on
their surface by the barrel through which they pass.
These two microscopes are in turn connected as I previously explained, with a cross arm which bears in its ends
a set of prisms. The images of these bullets travel up
the tops of the microscope and strike these prisms which
reflect these images inward at an angle of 901. They
then strike the second set of prisms which reflect them
upwards, side by side in a single eye piece which is di-
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vided into two equal parts. If we look into this eye
piece, we see a composite image composed in part of the
evidence bulletin and of the test bullet. We rotate our
evidence bullet into such a position that the groove left
on it by the barrel comes well into view. We then leave
that bullet alone. The bullets are held on little rotating
mounts whereby they may be rotated readily, and fixed
on these mounts by wax, so that they will not be grasped
by anything mechanical which would leave on them marks
which they had not previously received. Having brought
the evidence bullet to rest, we rotate the test bullet in
such a fashion as to bring up a groove and match it on
the fixed groove on our evidence bullet. If these bullets
are through an arm of the same make and caliber, the
grooved edges will fuse, and will match for width, for
angle, for number and for direction, and -in addition,
where they have been fired through the same arm, a certain number of very fine miscroscopic lines will be found
flowing together and across our dividing line and furnishing numerous points of identification. This is by
reason of the fact that in the rifling of an arm, certain
variations develop in the individual grooves of that particular arm. The arm prior to rifling is a perfectly
smooth barrel which is supposed to represent a circle
and through which a rifling rod is passed which bears a
cutter in a slot near its end. An illustration of a rifling
rod would be like this (illustrating on blackboard a
rifling rod and explaining the illustration as follows):
This is a circular tube just shy of a diameter of the
barrel of a gun. The cutting edge which is destined to
scrape out the grooves in the barrel is passed through
the barrel and it emerges from the barrel. The cutting
edge is automatically jacked up enough so that when the
cutter is withdrawn through the barrel the cutting edge
will gouge out a fine groove. The entire depth of the
groove is not made by one stroke, one stroke removing a
fraction of a thousandth of an inch of metal. The cutter is drawn through the barrel on a spiral movement,
cutting a shallow spiral groove in the surface of the
metal, the spiral corresponding with the make of the arm
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and the number of grooves desired. The cutting edge is
automatically withdrawn below the surface, so that when
the rifling head is returned it will not cut off the forward
stroke. The entire barrel is then brought around so that
the first groove is moved out of the way and a portion of
the barrel which is to be the location of the second groove
is brought into place. This process is repeated until the
desired number of grooves have been started. When
the cutter comes back to groove number one, it is raised
a trifle higher, so that when it is next drawn through the
barrel, it will deepen the first groove. This process is
then repeated on each groove the required number of
times until the groove has been cut to the required depth
which in American arms varies from three to five thousandths of an inch. This cutting edge theoretically is a
perfect arm cutting a perfect tract shaped groove in the
bore of the arm. It actually is impossible to make a
good tool with a perfect edge as is illustrated by pictures
of a razor blade under a microscope, and instead of this
edge being perfect, it has fine irregularities. Metal
against metal always results in wear, so that these irregularities are constantly changing as the cutting tool
is being drawn through the barrel, the result being that
the marks which are present in groove number two differ materially from those which are present in groove
number one, and so on in each groove. The grooves are
the same width and the same depth, but these little
things present in the bottom of the grooves differ in
different barrels, and when we compare two bullets fired
through the same barrel, we can find lines on their surfaces which emerge at the same point which are more or
less permanent, depending on whether the barrel was in
the same condition when the two bullets were fired or in
a different condition, but always more or less lines being
present identically upon both bullets. It was on this basis
that I made my comparison of the evidence bullet and the
test bullet which I had fired, and found enough lines
identical upon the two to satisfy me that both had passed
through the same barrel. In regard to the discharged
shotgun shells which have been introduced in evidence, it
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is my opinion that they were fired in Exhibit No. C (Exhibit No. C being a sawed off shotgun). I arrived at my
opinion by firing cartridges of the same make and type,
through States Exhibit No. C, being the evidence shotgun, and comparing the imprints of the firing pins left
in the primers of those cartridges with the imprints of
the firing pins left in the primers of the two shotgun
shells which had been introduced in evidence, and also
comparing the marks left by recoil against the breach of
the arm on the two shells fired experimentally with similar marks left on the two evidence shells. I can tell
from my experiment just which barrel of the shotgun,
States Exhibit No. D (being a discharged shotgun shell)
was shot from. I based my opinion upon the following:
No two firing pins are identically alike even though they
are in the same double barrel shotgun, because in the
course of manufacture they are subject to variations due
to the wear of the tools which form them, the result being that each firing pin bears on its tip a series of concentric circles left by minute irregularities on the cutting edge which shapes that tip off to a rounded form.
Firing pins made in succession will bear a different series
of circles due to the wear of the cutting tool and to the
hardness of metal that firing pins are composed of, the
result being that when a given firing pin leaves an imprint on the primer of a shell, an examination of that
imprint will show a series of circles, all with the same
center and varying in diameter. Another firing pin if
made immediately afterward on the same machine, will
leave a series of circles on the primers which it explodes, but these circles will not be of the same diameter
as those in the preceding firing pin, hence, by comparing
two shells exploded with the same firing pin, we get out
circles of the same number and diameter. If the shells
were exploded with different firing pins the circles are
usually different in number and in diameter, or both.
We also have this additional factor. When a shell is exploded, a pressure of three to five tons to a square inch
is developed, and the pressure slams the shell against
the breach of the arm with the same force that it drives
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the charge down the barrel. The breach of the arm bears
the marks of the tool that machined it. It also bears the
mark of the file which has been used on it to smooth off
the surface and take away all irregularities. These file
marks differ in each arm and they differ on various parts
of the same breach, and the shell when it recoils against
the breach picks up these marks on the soft copper cap
which comes in contact with the breach. The caps fired
from the same barrel with the same arm will take up the
same series of file markings on the steel breach. A shell
fired in another barrel will take up a different series of
markings.
As has been heretofore suggested the foregoing testimony could and perhaps would in another case, differ
somewhat, depending upon the circumstances, but it is
hoped that it is sufficiently complete to make it possible
for the reader to understand the legal questions which
arise in determining whether or not the testimony of
such an expert can or should be admitted in evidence and
if so under what circumstances. The question of the
admissibility of this type of evidence suggests a number
of interesting questions among the foremost of which are
the following: First-what are the objections to the
testimony of a ballistic expert and what are the arguments in favor of the admission of such testimony; Second-if the testimony. of a ballistic expert is to be admitted what evidence must be introduced in order to
procure the admission in evidence of the bullets, shotgun shells, or guns which it is alleged have been used
in the perpetration of the crime in question and to which
his testimony will be confined; Third-if the expert is
permitted to testify at all, should he be allowed to give
his opinion as to whether or not the evidence bullet or
shell has been fired from the evidence gun or should his
testimony be restricted to explaining wherein the experimental bullets or shells are similar to the evidence
bullets or shells; Fourth-should the witness, if he is
allowed to give his opinion, be permitted to explain the
basis of his opinion as by the use of a blackboard, or the
exhibition to the jury of the experimental shells, bullets,

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

shot gun wadding etc. and Fifth-what qualifications
must the witness have in order to qualify himself as a
ballistic expert.
In order to determine the answers to the question
"What are the objections to the testimony of a ballistic
expert and what are the arguments in favor of the admission of such testimony," let us first consider one of
the cases in which evidence has been introduced relative
to the use and identification of firearms and bullets. In
Meyers v. The State, 14 Tex. Ct. App. 35, the defendant
was on trial for assault with intent to murder. One of
the witnesses, called on behalf of the state, testified that
at the time he arrested the defendant (at the house of the
defendant), he found a double barreled shotgun with the
left tube broken, that the right-hand barrel was loaded
and damp, and the wadding was found to be powder
burned and the cap was not bright. The witness had
had considerable experience in the use of firearms and
gave it as his opinion that this barrel had been recently
discharged. Another witness called on behalf of the
state, who was likewise experienced in the use of firearms, was also permitted to state that in his opinion the
gun in question had been recently discharged. The introduction of this evidence was assigned by the plaintiff
in error as ground for reversal. In discussing the evidence, the court said:
"Where the use of firearms is as common as in this
country, it can scarcely be said to be a matter of peculiar
skill to determine whether or not a firearm has been recently discharged. If, however, it is necessary that a
witness should qualify himself as an expert before his
testimony is admissible as to that fact, then we think the
witnesses in this case qualified themselves sufficiently before testifying as to their opinion on the subject. They
showed they had had experience in the use and handling
of firearms, and stated that they inserted the finger into
the muzzle of the defendant's gun, and when the finger
was withdrawn it was wet and black, from which, in their
opinion, the gun must have been recently discharged.
(Connor v. Sturtevant, 117 Mass. 122). As expert testimony, the court did not err in admitting the evidence."
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While the opinion in this case does not disclose with
particularity, the objection which was made to the testimony of the two witnesses as heretofore outlined, it appears from the court's discussion of the evidence that it
was the contention of the defendant that the matter testified to by the witnesses was not the subject of expert
testimony, but consisted of matters of common knowledge which any one who was in the slightest degree acwith firearms could have given.
quainted
. In the case
of State v. Jones, 41 Kas. 309, 21 Pac. 265,
the defendant was on trial for murder. There were but
two witnesses to the homicide; one, the defendant, who
claimed he acted in self defense, testified he was only
seven or eight feet from the deceased when he discharged
his gun and killed the deceased; the other, a ten year
old son of the deceased, said the defendant was more
than seventy feet distant from the deceased when the
deceased was killed. The examination of the wound disclosed that the shot entered the body of the deceased
within a space of two inches in diameter with the exception of three or four shot just outside of this space. At
the trial in the. lower court the defendant offered the
testimony of two witnesses for the purpose of showing
from the nature and size of the wound, the proximate
distance the defendant must have been from the deceased
at the time of the shooting. One of the witnesses by the
name of McLaughlin, testified that he was a manufacturer and trader in breech and muzzle loading guns; that
he was a gunsmith by trade, and had been in the business
for 30 years; that he had experimented with guns and
muskets such as the one used by the defendant; that it
had been a study with him, and with men in his business,
to find how guns could be manufactured to throw shot
compactly for a distance, and that they tried to manufacture improved guns which would increase the distance they would thus carry a load of shot; that by experiment and study he had obtained a definite and accurate knowledge of how far shotguns of all kinds would
carry without scattering. He further stated that he had
sufficient experience to tell from the character of the
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wound about the distance the gun discharged would be
from the person shot; that he had experimented himself, and seen others experiment, with shotguns and muskets, when loaded with powder and double B shot, to see
how far they would carry without scattering. He was
then asked:
Question. From such experiment and observation, are
you able to tell with any degree of accuracy how far
such a gun would throw shot without scattering beyond
what would be a distance two inches in diameter, with
four or five shots just around the edge of the space two
inches in diameter? Answer. I can state the distance
within which such a shot would necessarily be made.
Question. State what the distance would be. (Objected
to on the ground that said question is one of fact for
the jury, and not such a one as requires the opinion of
an expert.) The court sustained the objection to this
and other questions of like character which were asked.
In passing on the ruling of the lower court in sustaining
the foregoing objections, the Supreme Court of Kansas
said:
"We believe that the evidence sought to be introduced
by these questions was competent, and that its rejection
was error. It was material testimony in this case. The
testimony of Jones, the defendant, and this lad, were
upon two theories of the case, and were distinctly inconsistent. One had testified that the parties were only 7
feet apart at the time of the shooting, while the other
had located them from 60 to 100 feet from each other.
It became a matter of vital importance to determine
which account of the homicide was truthful,-that of
the boy or of the defendant. One of the important facts
to be found by the jury was the distance the defendant
and deceased were from each other when the fatal shot
was fired. The determination of that disputed question
would have in this case very great importance in determining whether the testimony of the boy, White, or
the defendant should have been given greater credence.
If the boy's testimony was true, then the defendant was
guilty of murder in the first degree, beyond a reasonable
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doubt; and, on the other hand, it is equally plain, if the
defendant told the truth, he certainly was not guilty of
that degree of homicide. If there is any rule known by
those who have made the use of firearms a special study,
showing at what distance shot could be thrown compactly, and at what distance they would scatter, it should
have been given to the jury, either as a corroboration
or refutation of either the defendant or of the young
lad, White. The theory of the state is that this testimony was not expert testimony; that the jury was as
competent to determine the distance the parties were
apart when deceased was shot as the gunsmith; and it
cites a long list of authorities to support its contention.
We have examined all that have been cited, and believe
that no one of them, is applicable to this case. They are
all based upon the question of the relative position of
the parties to a homicide, showing from what direction
the shot was fired, and whether the assailant was at the
front, side, or back of the party killed. None of these
authorities reach the question here in dispute. It is
not whether Jones was at the left side of White; that he
was on higher ground or lower ground; or that he stood
north, south, east, or west of the party killed,-but how
far was he from him. If that was a matter that could
be determined by an experienced man from the size of
the wound, then this testimony would not have been expert testimony. On this subject Mr. McLaughlin testified that he and others in his trade had made it a study
to devise methods for shooting shot a long distance
compactly, and that by reason of his study and observation he was able accurately to state how far shot could
be thrown from the musket in question. We are of the
opinion that very few men have any definite or accurate
idea of the manter and distance shot would scattet
when fired from a gun. Of course, all know that they
are discharged in a compact body from the muzzle of
the gun, but how far they go before they begin to separate, and the extent or the relation of the distance from
the gun to their separationfrom each other, is a subject
upon which one, without special experience and study,
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could not even make an intelligent guess. In other words,
this is a question of science, to be ascertained by study
and experience, and does not come within the common
knowledge of men."
It is worth noting that in the foregoing case the
objection to the testimony of the firearms' expert was
again based on the fact that the matter which he was
testifying to was not a proper subject for expert testimony. It is also worth noting that the testimony of the
witness in this case was confined to the manner in which
shot would separate when fired from a shotgun. This
testimony was, therefore, confined largely. to what
would probably be classed as external ballistics. The
opinion is important, however, because it recognizes that
the study of firearms and ammunition used therein is a
scientific subject.
In Moughon v. The State of Georgia, 57 Ga. 102, the
defendant was on trial for the offense of assault with
intent to murder. In this case it was held that "the
opinion of a witness experienced in the use of guns, as
to the length of time since a gun was fired off, is admissible evidence in connection with the facts on which it,
is founded, and that the shot found (next day after the
shooting) in one barrel of the prisoner's gun, the other
being empty, were compared with those which lodged
in and about the person assaulted, and were like them,
is admissible evidence.
Thus it is clear that this court recognized that it was
proper to permit evidence to be introduced relative to
the use of the firearm which it was claimed had been
used in the perpetration of the crime for which the defendant was being tried.
In Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. E. 748,
the government contended that the deceased was shot
with a Winchester rifle that was in the kitchen of the
house occupied by the defendant. Two bullets were
found in the body of the deceased and the governmenti
was allowed to prove that another bullet of the- ame-.
calibre had been pushed through the rifle on or shortly
after October 24, which latter date was abo'it
twd weeks
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after the crime in question had been committed. The
prosecution was then allowed to put this bullet in evidence and also photographs from this and the two bullets from the body in order to show that the marks from
the rifle in the two cases coincided so closely as to prove
that all three bullets had passed through the same rifle
barrel. This evidence was objected to by the defendant.
The court in its opinion said:
"The main ground seems to be that the conditions of
the experiment did not correspond accurately with those
of the date of the shooting, that the force impelling the
different bullets were different in kind, that the rifle
barrel might be supposed to have rusted more in the
little more than a fortnight that had intervened, and that
it was fired three times on October 10, which would have
increased the leading of the barrel. We see no other
way in which the jury could have learned so intelligently
how that gun barrel would have marked a lead bullet
fired through it, a question of much importance to the
case. Not only was it the best evidence attainable but
the sources of error suggested were trifling. The photographs avowedly were arranged to bring out the likeness in the marking of the different bullets and were
objected to on this further ground. But the jury could
correct them by inspection of the originals, if there were
other aspects more favorable to the defense."
With reference to the bullets found in the body an
expert was allowed to testify that they were marked by
rust in the same way that they would have been if they
had been fired through the rifle found at the farm, and
that it took at least several months for the rust that he
saw in the rifle to form. It is objected that these were
not matters for expert testimony and the court said:
"We see no reason to doubt that the testimony was properly admitted."
In none of the foregoing cases which have been cited,
did the witnesses give testimony which corresponded
exactly with the testimony which has been outlined in
the early part of this article. Nevertheless the cases
are sufficiently similar to be classed in one group. There
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are, however, other objections to the testimony of the
type given by the witness, X, which have been suggested
from time to time by persons who are familiar with
criminal procedure and the trial of criminal cases. In
the first place, the remarkable lack of authorities upon
the question indicates that the subject is rather new and
novel, and therefore, according to the theory of some, it
is unreliable. The courts have given some recognition
to the doctrine that evidence is inadmissible when it is
new and novel in type and has not yet stood the test of
time or is too unreliable to be safe.
The Supreme Court of Illinois substantially recognized this doctrine in the case of People v. Pfanschmidt,
262 Ill. 411, where it was sought to introduce evidence
relative to the conduct of bloodhounds. In commenting
on the evidence which was introduced in this case as to
the manner in which the bloodhounds had acted, the
court, after discussing the preliminary evidence which
had been introduced, state:
"We agree fully with the statement in Brott v. State,
supra, [70 Nebr. 395, 97 N. W. Rep. 593] that the 'conclusions of the bloodhound are generally too unreliable
to be accepted as evidence in either civil or criminal
cases. '

"

The court further cited with approval the following
language from Brott v. State, supra:
"The bloodhound is, we admit, frequently right in his
conclusions, but that he is frequently wrong is a fact
well attested by experience. * * * It is unsafe evidence, and both reason and instinct condemn it."
In the case of a ballistic expert's testimony it has been
contended that such evidence is too new and novel to
warrant considering it as safe evidence, and if a court
were to adopt this contention it apparently would have
to rule out such evidence if the court in question recognized, as did the Illinois court, that evidence which is
unsafe should not be admitted in the trial of a criminal
case. Furthermore, this type of evidence has been objected to on the theory that the evidence bullet which has
been extracted from the wounded or deceased person
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may have become so materially distorted as to mislead
the expert. For example, the bullet may have struck a
bone in the body or it may have come in contact with
metal or acid after being fired from the gun, and thereby
have become so distorted as to mislead the expert, thus
rendering the testimony of- the expert unreliable. These
objections, however, would appear to go rather to the
weight of the evidence than to the admissibility of the
evidence. Also, there is the further objection that the
testimony of a ballistic expert is usually the outgrouth
of experiments made out of the presence of the defendant, and that the defendant having no opportunity to
make a similar experiment, cannot meet the testimony
of the expert, except, possibly, by cross-examination.
Perhaps this objection is of a more practical than a
legal nature, though the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Painterv. The People, 147 Ill. 444, indicated that .it was
not greatly in favor of evidence which was based on
experiments made before the trial. The court in its
opinion said:
"But it is said that the testimony of these witnesses
that they saw and were able to recognize and clearly
identify the defendant in the hall below can not be true
because certain gentlemen subsequently tried the experiment of placing themselves in the same position and with
like surroundings, and were unable to recognize the
countenance or dress of persons passing through the hall.
It might perhaps be said that this experiment is fairly
offset by a counter experiment afterwards made by witnesses for the prosecution, in which precisely the opposite result was reached. But if proof of such experiments is competent at all, it is manifest that it is entitled to but little weight, owing to the difficulty if not
impossibility of knowing that the experiments were made
under substantially the same conditions which were
present at the time these witnesses claim to have seen
the defendant come out of the apartments where the
domicide had just been committed."
The objection of the court to the experiment in this
case was apparently founded upon the impossibility of
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knowing that the experiments were made under substantially the same conditions which were present when
the crime was committed. By using care in making his
experiments, a ballistic expert could undoubtedly conduct them under substantially the same circumstances as
existed when the crime had been committed. For instance, he could obtain a shell of the same make containing substantially thd same amount of powder and
lead bullets as the evidence shells, could fire them into
a substance which would give practically the same resistance as the human body and thereby meet the objection to evidence based on experiments, as outlined by
the Supreme Court of Illinois in Painter v. The People,
supra. In Ulrich v. The People, 39 Mich. 245, evidence
was offered to show that a month or six weeks after the
crime in question had been committed, an examination
was made in the wheat field, and again after the wheat
was harvested, and that no signs of a struggle were then
discovered. The court said in considering this evidence:
"This was very properly excluded as being altogether
too remote to be entitled to any consideration in the
case. The same is true of the experiments made in attempting to lift girls over this fence for the purpose of
contradicting the girl wherein she testified that the respondent had dragged her over the fence. Whether she
was literally dragged over by force or got over voluntarily through fear was of but slight consequence in the
case. Manufactured evidence is not the most reliable,
and the cases are few where it ever should be admitted.
This is not one of them."
The Supreme Court of Michigan was apparently of
the opinion that evidence which was founded upon experiments was in the nature of manufactured evidence
and should therefore be admitted with great care. In
view of the attitude of the Illinois Court and the Michigan Court in the last two mentioned cases, it is apparent
that there is some merit to the contention that the testimony of a ballistic expert should not be admitted because
it is founded upon experiments. On the other hand, if
great care is used in making the experiments, it would
seem that this objection would be overcome.
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Proponents of ballistic evidence either deny that
there is any merit to the foregoing objections or say
that if there is any merit to the objections these objections must give way to new ideas and modern methods
and that if the courts are going to keep abreast of the
times a more liberal attitude oward evidence of a scientific nature must be adopted. There is a great deal
of common sense in this contehtion, particularly when
one considers that the criminal in his operations ordinarily has unlimited use of modern appliances such as
automobiles, machine guns, airplanes, etc.
In order to get a clearer understanding of the other
legal aspects of this very important question, let us as.
sume for the sake of argument, that ballistic evidence
developed to its highest point of efficiency as outlined by
the testimony of the witness X, is to be admitted in the
trial of criminal cases. This leads us to a discussion of
the second point, namely, "What evidence must be introduced in order to procure the admission in evidence of
the bullets, shotgun shells or guns which it is alleged
have been used in the perpetration of the crime in question, and to which the testimony of the ballistic expert
will be confined." As has been suggested before, it is
possible that the evidence bullet may have become distorted through contact with a bone in the human body
or through contact with the steel forceps used by the
physician in removing the bullet, or through contact with
the container in which the bullet is placed after it has
been removed from the body, or by coming in contact
with acids or any other external substance which may
affect the condition of the evidence bullet, or could conceivably affect the condition of the evidence gun or shotgun shells, as the case may be. It is apparent that great
care should be taken in handling the exhibits which are
to be introduced in evidence, particularly prior to the
time when the ballistic expert makes his experiment.
There is a case in Illinois where the court has had occasion to discuss this proposition. In People v. Berkman,
307 Ill. 492, the State in the lower court was permitted
to introduce in evidence one of the bullets which was
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claimed to have been fired into the body of the assailed
and which the evidence showed to be a bullet fired from
a thirty-two caliber gun. The exhibit was not identified
as the same bullet that was extracted by the physician
from the back of the assailed. The physician testified
on the trial that he could not identify it as the same bullet that he had cut out of the back of the assailed, that
after he took it out of his back he handed it to a nurse,
but the witness did not give the name of the nurse. The
only other evidence concerning the identify of the bullet
was given by the person who had been assailed, who
testified that one of the nurses handed him the bullet
and said that it was the bullet that was cut out of his
back by the physician, but the witness did not give the
name of the nurse. The court said, when commenting
on this evidence:
"Exhibits of this character are not admissible as evidence until they are clearly identified."
The revolver which had been found the next morning
near where the defendant was lying in the prairie after
he had been shot by the officer was also introduced in
evidence. in discussing this evidence the court said:
"This revolver was not shown by competent evidence
to be the revolver with which Rahn was shot a month
before it was found. Even if it could be said that the
proof showed by circumstances that this was a revolver
in the possession of the defendant on the night of April
13th. It was not proof of the fact that he had this gun
on March 13 and was the gun which he shot Rahn."
After the introduction of the gun and bullet, the State
undertook to prove by the opinion evidence of one officer Dickson that this revolver was the identical revolver from which the bullet introduced in evidence was
fired on the night Rahn was shot. Without commenting
at this time on the attitude of the court toward the evidence of Officer Dickson it is sufficient to note that the
foregoing decision readily recognizes that exhibits of this
character are not to be admitted in evidence until they
are clearly identified. While this would probably be
true in any case, it would seem to be particularly true
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in cases where a ballistic expert is to testify. In the
case of State v. Hossack, 116 Ia. 184, 89 N. W. 1077, on
the morning after the homicide the sheriff took three
hairs from the ax which was found under the grainery,
put them in his pocketbook, and some days after they
were placed in a bottle which he delivered to the county
attorney. Later, the body of the deceased was exhumed
and some hair taken from his head near the wounds, by
the sheriff. After this the witness, with the county attorney, went to an expert. The witness delivered to the
expert the hairs he had taken from the head of the
corpse and the county attorney delivered to the expert
a bottle containing three hairs, supposedly the ones
taken from the ax, but there was no other evidence to
identify or show how they had been kept while in the
possession of the county attorney. The expert was
called on the stand as a witness for the State and gave
evidence tending to identify at least one of the three
hairs taken from the ax, as a human hair and similar to
thos taken from the head of the deceased. No objection
was made at the time to this testimony, but thereafter,
when the State offered the three hairs examined by the
expert and supposedly taken from the ax in evidence,
on objection of the defendant they were ruled out as not
being properly identified nor anything shown as to the
manner in which they were kept by the county attorney.
But a motion made by defendant to strike out the evidence of the expert with relation to the hairs was overruled. In commenting on this the Court said:
"If the hairs were not admissible, it is difficult to
perceive why the evidence in relation to them was retained. In criminal cases we are not so strict in holding
parties to a timely objection to testimony as in civil
causes. If this testimony was not admissible, it should
have been ruled out on motion. It is thought by the
State that, as the hairs were traced into the possession
of the county attorney, the presumption that he did his
duty in the matter will sustain the conclusion that the
hairs were not tampered with while in his possession.
But it is no more the duty of the county attorney than
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of any other person to preserve and care for such articles. It was not his duty to take them into his custody
at all. He might well have left them with the sheriff.
In cases of this kind preliminary proof of the identity
of the thing submitted to the expert, and that it has not
been tampered with, is required. Rog. E xp. Test. 110;
State v. Cook, 17 Kan. 394. The evidence of the expert
should have been excluded."
The Iowa court clearly recognized that preliminary
proof of the identity of the things submitted to the expert, and that they have not been tampered with, is required. While this case did not involve the testimony of
a ballistic expert, by anology it would seem reasonable
to assume that the requirement outlined by the Iowa
court would apply with equal or greater force to objects
which are going to be introduced in evidence and have
been the object of experiments by a ballistic expert. The
safest rule for the court to follow in the matter of preliminary proof would be to require the State to bring in
all of the witnesses who had the custody of the exhibits
prior to their introduction in evidence, and to establish
by a connected chain, not only the connection between
the exhibits and the crime but also that the exhibits
when offered in evidence were in the same condition as
when each had last seen them.
Having now considered the preliminary evidence
which must be introduced to lay the foundation for the
testimony of the ballistic expert, let us consider the third
subject which has been heretofore outlined for discussion.
"If the expert is permitted to testify, should he be
allowed to give his opinion as to whether or not the evidence bullet or shell had been fired from the evidence
gun, or should his testimony be restricted to explaining
wherein the experimental bullet or shells are similar to
the evidence bullet or shells."
The answer to this question would seem to depend on
whether or not the court recognizes ballistics as a science. If it is recognized as a science, then the expert
would be justified in giving his opinion. If it is not
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recognized as 4 science, then the expert should be limited to explaining wherein the experimental bullet or
shells are similar to the evidence bullet or shells. In
People v. Berkman, supra, the State 'undertook to prove
by the opinion evidence of one Officer Dickson that the
revolver which had been introduced in evidence was
the identical revolver from which the bullet introduced
in evidence was fired on the night the person assailed was
shot. After testifying as to his qualifications the witness was asked to examine the revolver in question and
gave it as his opinion that the bullet introduced in evidence was fired from the revolver in evidence. He stated
positively that he knew that the bullet came out of the
barrel of that revolver because the rifling marks of the
bullet fitted into the rifling of the revolver in question,
and that the markings on that particular bullet were peculiar because they came clear up on the steel of the
bullet. The court in commenting on this evidence said:
"There is no evidence in the case by which this officer claims to be an expert, that shows that he knew
anything about how Colt automatic revolvers are made
and how they are rifled. There is no testimony in the
record showing that the revolver in question was rifled
in a manner different from all others of its model, and
we feel very sure that no such evidence could be produced. The evidence of this officer is clearly absurd,
besides not being based upon any known rule that would
make it admissible. If the real facts were brought out,
it would undoubtedly show that all Colt revolvers of the
same model and of the same caliber are rifled precisely
in the same manner, and a statement that one can know
that a certain bullet was fired out of a thirty-two caliber
revolver, when there are hundreds and perhaps thousands of others rifled in precisely the same manner and
of precisely the same character, is preposterous.
"There are many instances in which opinion evidence
is admissible on the part of both expert and non-expert
witnesses. The speed of trains, of automobiles, of
horses, values of property, sanity or insanity, intoxication of individuals, physical condition of a person, size
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and color and weight of objects, and many other such
facts may be shown by opinion evidence when such
opinion is based upon proper facts and opportunity of
the witness to observe the things or persons and where
it is impossible for the witness to detail all pertinent
facts in such a manner as to enable the jury to form a
conclusion without the opinion of the witness. The general rule that facts, and not conclusions should be stated
is a wise and safe one and cannot be too strictly followed. Mere opportunity does not change an ordinary
observer into an expert, and special skill does not entitle
a witness to give an opinion when the subject is one
where the opinion of an ordinary observer is admissible
or where the jury are capable of forming their own conclusions from the pertinent facts susceptible of proof in
common form. (Jones' Commentaries on Evidence,
Sees. 359, 360.) If it were possible in this case to determine whether or not the bullet in question was fired
from the gun' in question, it must have been by the
peculiar riffing or condition of the gun that made what
are dalled the peculiar markings on the bullet aforesaid.
If any facts pertaining to the gun and its riffing existed
by which such fact could be known, it would have been
proper for the witness to have stated such facts and let
the jury draw their own conclusions. Under the testimony of this witness, if allowable, the court would have
had no alternative except to admit the gun in evidence
if the proof had been positive that the bullet in question
was the bullet cut out of Rahn's back by the physician.
It is stated by Jones on Evidence in the sections above
cited, that the general rule that facts, and not conclusions, should be stated tends to prevent fraud and perjury and is one of the strongest safeguards of personal
liberty and private rights, and that whenever it is doubtful whether a case falls under the rule or under one of its
exceptions, the wise course is to place it under the rule."
It can readily be seen that the Supreme Court of Illinois in this opinion did not recognize the subject of
ballistics as a science and that it was, therefore, of the
opinion that the witness in question could have testified
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to the facts pertaining to the gun and its rifling which
would show that the bullet in question had been fired
from the gun in question and that the jury should be
left to draw their own conclusions from such facts. This
opinion was filed on April 18, 1923. In People v. Fiorita,
339 Ill. 78, another case came before the Supreme Court
of Illinois which involved the testimony of an alleged
ballistic expert. Without discussing at this point the
qualifications outlined by the witness in this case let us
first consider his other testimony. The witness stated
that by examining a bullet fired through a revolver he
could tell the kind of revolver that propelled the bullet,
that every revolver would make grooves and bands on
the bullet which would have distinctive markings, that
he had fired a test bullet through the gun introduced in
evidence marked exhibit 3, being the gun taken from
Nessor's and Fiorita's hotel room and that by comparison and examination of both bullets he was of the opinion
that the bullet found in the body of Baltz, was fired from
exhibit 3. The testimony of the witness was very extensive and elaborate but the court considered it unnecessary to recite further details because of the courts
consideration that the witness did not possess such
knowledge or experience as would qualify him as a ballistic expert. In its opinion, however, the court said,
relative to ballistics being a science,
"While the science of ballistics is now a well recognized science both in this country and abroad, testimony
based upon it should be admitted with the greatest
care."
After discussing again the qualifications of the witness
in question the court continued as follows:
"Where previous study is essential to the formation
of an opinion sought to be put in evidence, only such persons are competent to testify as experts as have by experience, special learning and training gained a know]edge of the subject matter upon which an opinion is to
be given, superior to that of an ordinary person." This
opinion was filed February 21, 1930, approximately
seven years after the opinion of the same court in the
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case of People v. Berkman, supra. During this interim
the attitude of the Supreme Court of Illinois toward
ballistics as a science apparently had materially changed,
for the court in the later opinion recognized ballistics
as a science and also that -a properly trained ballistic
expert could in a proper case give his opinion as to
whether or not a particular bullet had been fired from
a particular gun and would not be limited to merely
stating wherein the evidence bullet is similar to the experimental bullet. The altered attitude of the court
toward the extent to which the expert could testify apparently arose through the recognition on its part that
ballistics is a science. In People v. Manke, 78 N. Y. Rep.
611, the defendant was on trial for murder. On the trial
it was proved that the person whom the defendant was
charged with killing was shot, and near the place where
the killing is alleged to have taken place was found some
paper, which was claimed by the district attorney to have
been the wadding with which the gun was loaded. This
alleged wadding was produced at the trial and a witness, who stated that he had used firearms a great deal,
and was familiar with the appearance of wadding shot
from gun, was asked this question:
"You may answer whether that (the paper found as
stated) had that appearance or not?"
This and the answer to it were objected to on the part of
the prisoner, on the ground that the subject was not one
of science or skill, and the opinion of the witness was incompetent and improper; that the paper and its appearance should be described and the jury should draw the
inference. The court overruled the objection and allowed the witness, as far as he could, to state the facts as
he observed them, and the prisoner excepted. The witness answered:
"Yes, sir; it had the appearance of being wadding shot
from a gun;" and the only fact he stated was that it was
burned. The General Term reversed the judgment and
granted a new trial, holding that this exception was well
taken. The court said "we concur generally in the opinion
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there pronounced. We regard the question as a border
one; and its competency is not free from doubt." While
the facts in this case involve only a portion of shotgun
wadding, nevertheless, shotgun wadding would include
one phase of the subject of ballistics, and the court evidently thought that the subject was not one of science or
skill and, therefore, that the opinion of the witness was
incompetent and improper. In Moughan v. The State,
Supra, the witness was allowed to express his opinion as
to the length of time a particular gun had been discharged as were also the witnesses in Meyers v. The
State, Supra and in State v. Jones, Supra, the court of
Kansas held that the witness should have been permitted
to give his opinion as to how far a gun would throw shot
without scattering the same. In the last mentioned case
the court recognized that the testimony was expert testimony and required special knowledge and skill in order
to give the same, and in its opinion said, "In other words
this is a question of science to be ascertained by study
and experience and does not come within the common
knowledge of men." In view of the foregoing decisions
the test to be applied in deterining whether or not the
ballistic expert can give his opinion or merely relate the
facts, and leave it to the jury to draw their conclusions
therefrom, is whether or not the court recognizes that
the facts testified to by the ballistic expert constitute matters of skill and science. If they do then the expert should
be permitted to give his opinion, otherwise not.
In all of the foregoing cases the witnesses enter into
more or less detail depending upon the circumstances in
the particular case. This then leads to the fourth question viz: "whether or not the witness should be allowed
to explain the basis of his opinion as by the use of a
blackboard or the exhibition to the jury of the experimental shells, bullets, shotgun wadding, etc. In Commonwealth v. Best, Supra, the court held that a bullet of
the same caliber as those found in decedents body and
which some two weeks afterwards had been pushed
through the rifle which, according to the state's contention was used to do the shooting, was not inadmissible
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to show the similarity in marking on the ground that
the force impelling the bullets was different, that the
rifle barrel might be supposed to have been rusted more
or less in the two weeks, and that it was fired three times
two days after the homicide, which would have increased
the leading of the barrel. In other words the experimental bullet was introduced in evidence in this case. It
is worth noting however, that the objection was not made
at the time, that the experimental bullet was not admissable because it was no part of the crime and was not
used in the commission of the crime. Under the circumstances it is impossible to say what position the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts would have taken had
such an objection to its admissibility been made.
The fact remains, however, that the experimental
bullet was introduced in evidence and its introduction received the approval of the reviewing
court. In Johnson v. State, 59 N. J. 535, 37 Atl. 949, certain witnesses testified to having seen certain footprints
of a peculiar character in the dirt and soil near the body
of the woman who had been murdered and for the purpose of showing that such footprints had been made by
the defendant on trial, the state produced the boots that
were worn by the prisoner on the night in question. Certain impressions in sand, made in the presence of the
jury by the boots just mentioned, were exhibited to the
jury against objections taken by counsel of the defendant. In passing on this exhibit the court said, "The testimony of the witnesses with regard to the appearance of
these footprints was undoubtedly competent. Such testimony involved in no sense the knowledge of an expert,
and the exhibition of the boots worn by the defendant on
the night in question, and the impress in the sand by way
of illustration with them were also competent." While
in this case the court sanctioned exhibits in the presence
of the jury it apparently did so upon the theory that the
evidence in no sense involved the knowledge of an expert. The objection, to the admission in evidence of the
experimental bullet or to a detailed demonstration in
court as by the use of a blackboard or by comparing in
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court the experimental bullet with the evidence bullet,
has also been based upon the theory that such conduct on
the part of the witness serves to place undue emphasis
on his testimony. In the case of People v. Jumpertz, 21
ll. 375 the attorney for the people brought into court the
door of the room occupied by the defendant at the time
of the alleged murder, and two hooks and a quantity of
screws found in said room at the time of the arrest of
the defendant. The prosecutor then proposed to make
experiments on the door of the prisoner's room in the
presence of the jury with a view to testing the probability
of the deceased having hanged herself in the manner
stated by the prisoner in his confession. Certain experiments were made with the door, both by the defendant
and the state. In commenting on these experiments the
court said, "Nor can we approve of the exhibition to the
jury, during the recess of the court, of the door, screws,
hooks, etc., or the experiments made with them in the
presence of the jury during the trial. We will not say
that in no case can experiments be made in the presence
of the jury, for the purpose of illustrating some point
in controversy. Such a proceeding, to say the least, is
very uncommon, and should be permitted by the court
with great caution. We will not say that, were this the
only ground for reversing this judgment, that we would
yield to it." The physchological effect of a demonstration of any kind in court is to improperly place undue
emphasis on the evidence to which the demonstration pertains. However, as shown by the foregoing cases, the
courts have indicated that experiments which serve to
settle some points in controversy can properly be made
in the presence of the jury. Therefore, it would seem
proper to admit in evidence the experimental bullets and
shotgun shells and also to permit the expert to -explain
by the use of a blackboard the basis of his conclusions if
such experiment or demonstration in court will. lead to
the settlement of any point in controversy, provided the
rights of the accused are guarded by proper instructions
from the court, from any injury which might result to the
accused from any undue emphasis being placed on the
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testimony of the expert by the introduction of the experimental bullet or the use of the blackboard.
Inasmuch as the science of ballistics has of late undergone great development, it is highly desirable that the
court look carefully into the qualifications of the witness
before permitting him to testify. In People v. Berkman,
Supra, the state sought to qualify the ballistic expert by
having him testify that he had had charge of the inspection of firearms for the last five years of a police department ;that he was a small arms inspector in the National Guard for a period of nine years, and that he was
a sergeant in the service in the field artillery, where the
pistol is the only weapon the men have, outside of the
large guns or cannon. The court seemed inclined to the
opinion that the testimony which the witness gave was
absurd and commented upon the fact that there was no
evidence in the case to show that the witness knew anything about how Colt automatic revolvers are made and
how they are rifled, thereby leading one to believe that
the court was of the opinion that this witness did not
have sufficient qualifications to give the opinion which
he was permitted to give on the trial in the lower court.
In People v. Fiorita,Supra, the ballistic expert testified
that he had been employed by the St. Louis police department since February, 1927, that for a few months
preceding the date of the trial he had been the microscopic photographer and bullet examiner for the department; that his work consisted of identifying bullets as
having been fired from certain weapons; that the work
is done with a twin microscope with a single eye-piece;
that he had been a photographer for fifteen or twenty
years and at one time ran a shooting gallery and penny
arcade; that this was his only experience with firearms
until he became connected with the police department;
that he had never been to or worked in a factory where
guns were manufactured; that he thought the factory of
the Colt company was at Hartford, Connecticut, but was
not sure; that he did not know how guns looked when
they first came from the machines; that he did not positively know whether the markings were the same on each
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particular gun when they first came from the factory,
although he had read considerable about Colt specifications; that he had never attended a school or college
where the subject of ballistics is taught. In commenting
on the testimony of this witness the court stated that "no
witness should be permitted to testify regarding the identification of firearms and bullets by the use of this science
unless the witness has clearly shown that he is qualified
to give such testimony. In this case Lewis testified that
he had been employed by the St. Louis police department
and had been engaged in the identification of guns for
several months; that he had never been to an arms manufacturing plant or seen guns in the process of manufacture; that he had never seen the tools with which the
rifling is done; that he did not know how a gun looked
when it first came from the machine; that his experience
covered the examination of about 150 bullets. He made
no attempt to state what educational qualifications he
possessed, nor did he show that he had studied the works
of recognized authorities in this science. He admitted,
on cross-examination that he had never attended any
school or college where the science of ballistics is taught.
The question of the qualification of an expert witness
rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the
test of qualificationis necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness
of the particularwitness. Where previous study is essential to the formation of an opinion sought to be put in
evidence, only such persons are competent to testify as
experts as have by experience, special learning and training gained a knowledge of the subject matter upon which
an opinion is to be given, superior to that of an ordinary
person. The experience and training of the witness
Lewis, in this case, as shown by his testimony, were far
from sufficient to qualify him as an expert, and it was an
abuse of discretion for. the trial court to admit his testimony. "

The impossibility of laying down any hard and fast
rule as to what qualifications a witness must possess in
order to qualify as a ballistic expert is obvious. If, how-
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ever, the trial courts will apply the reasoning outlined by
the Supreme Court of Illinois in the last mentioned decision it should not be difficult to.determine when a ballistic witness has the proper qualifications, the test being,
is he possessed of a special learning and training through
which he has gained a knowledge of the subject matter
upon which an opinion is to be given which is superior to
that of an ordinary person and has he demonstrated to
the trial court that he has such ability, intelligence and
training as will make his opinion reliable.
From the foregoing discussion it can readily be seen
that there are many angles to consider in passing on the
admissiability of ballistic evidence particularly where
the expert is permitted to give his opinion as distinguished from the facts only upon which his opinoin is
based. Inasmuch as the defense has no opportunity to
overcome the experts testimony except possibly by crossexamination there is an unusual opportunity for fraud
which the courts will have to carefully guard against.
Perhaps the most logical suggestion which has been made
thus far is that the legislature pass a law providing for
notice to the defendant when the tests are to be made by
the expert, or in lieu thereof that the defense also be
given an opportunity to make similar experiments.

